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Shareholder voting by written proxy is permitted in Florida.' Proxies
are either general or special. A general proxy entitles the person casting
the vote at the meeting to use his discretion in voting, but the holder
of a limited proxy is authorized to vote on certain matters only or in a
certain manner. This distinction was brought into sharp focus in the
case of State ex ret. Halvey v. Coogan.2 P, a shareholder, obtained proxies
from other shareholders to vote their stock in favor of a proposed amend-
ment to the corporate by-laws. The proxies were general in form. Before
P could bring the proposed amendment to a vote, another shareholder
interjected an amendment to the proposal which materially altered its
purpose. P voted his proxies against the new proposal, but the chairman
refused to count P's proxies on the ground that P was authorized to
vote them only in favor of the proposed amendment. The court held
that since P's proxies were general in form, the chairman had no power
to limit their use, thus recognizing the aforementioned distinction between
general and limited proxies.
Directors- Removal by Shareholders
P, the president of a corporation, became its sole shareholder and
director upon its organization and the resignation of two "dummy"
incorporators and directors. As the remaining director, P designated A and
B to fill the vacancies on the board created thereby.3 The directors then
adopted a resolution authorizing only A and B to draw checks on the
corporate bank account. Later, at a special but informal meeting of the
board, P was removed as president by a 2-1 vote. That same day P called
a special stockholders' meeting, and, as sole stockholder, removed A
and B as directors and elected himself and two other persons as directors,
At this time there was no charter or by-law provision for removal of
directors, but P voted to amend the by-laws so as to authorize removal
without cause. The "new board" then authorized only P to draw checks
on the corporate bank account. P then sought a declaratory decree
declaring him to be the president and an injunction restraining A and B
*Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. FLA. STAT. § 608.10(5) (1955).
2. 98 So.2d 757 (Vla. App. 1959).
3. FijA. STAT. § 608.08(2) (1955): 'Vacancies in the board of directors shall
be filled until the next annual meeting of stockholders by the directors remaining in
office unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation."
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from acting as directors of the corporation and requiring the bank to
honor only P's signature on the corporation's checking account. Relief
was denied. 4
The analysis of the court serves as a practical lesson in corporate
procedure. First, it was observed that officers serve only at the pleasure
of directors." Therefore, P's removal as president by A and B was valid.
Second, the fact that the meeting at which P was removed was an
informal one did not affect its validity inasmuch as all directors were
present and participated. " Next, P (at the special meeting which he
called) had no power to remove A and B without cause prior to the
next regular annual meeting of shareholders, even though A and B were
originally not elected by the shareholders but only designated to fill
vacancies.
The case underscores the principle that, in the absence of statute7
or provision in the certificate of incorporation or by-laws, a director
cannot be removed from office before the expiration of his term, except
for cause. The rule may be criticized as unsound in that it denies the
real owners of a business the right to remove their agents, although
those agents may have become unsatisfactory to their principals, the
shareholders. The answer given, however, is that, unlike officers, who
arc agents serving at the pleasure of the board, directors are more akin
to public officers who have been elected to a fixed term of office. Further,
that the statutes requiring that corporations shall be managed by their
directors would have no meaning if directors were subject to an ever-
present threat of removal; directors would be mere men of straw. The
decision of the Florida court in this case, while open to criticism for
the above reasons, is in line with the law in most jurisdictions. 8
Voting Trusts
Although voting trusts are authorized by statute in Florida, the
statute does not sanction their use for any purpose; a valid business
objective must exist or the voting trust will be held illegal as against
4. Frank v. Anthony, 107 So.2d 136 (la. App. 1958).
5. See Fr_ .. STAT. § 608.40 (1955).
6. See Etheredge v. Barrow, 102 So.2d 660, 663 (Fla. App. 1958). (Where all
of the directors and shareholders of a close corporation were present and participated
in discussion of a corporate matter, a decision made on the matter was held valid
although the meeting was not a formal one.)
7. Although Florida has no statutory provision for removal of directors, the
corporate codes of California (Sec. 810), Minnesota (See. 29), Pennsylvania (Sec. 405)
and North Carolina (See. 55-27) provide for removal of a director without cause by
majority vote.
8. Tlie suggestion might be advanced that P, at the special meeting of shareholders,
could have amended the by-laws so as to increase the number of directors and regain the
balance of voting power by "loading" the board. But even this aveite is not open to him,
for the statute provides that, "An increase in the number of directors shall create
vacancies for the porpose of this section . .. Vacancies . . . shall be filled . . . by the
directors remaining in office," (Emphasis added.) FLA. STAT. § 608.08(2) (1955).
9. F.A. STAT. § 608.43 (1955).
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public policy. In Central Bank 6 Trust Co. v. Davis,' the officers and
directors of a financially embarrassed corporation, in order to forestall
suit by a creditor, established voting trusts of all their stock. These voting
trusts were created in good faith and did not result in placing beyond
reach of the creditor any assets. Since the voting trusts were established
in good faith and for a legitimate business purpose, the court refused to
set them aside.11
LIABILITIES AND LOYALTIES OF DIRECTORS
It is a familiar principle of corporation law that corporate officials
occupy a fiduciary relation to the corporation. Such a relationship calls
for undivided loyalty on the part of the official. He will be held account-
able for personal profits arising from opportunities which rightfully belong
to the corporation or for profitable activities which stem from a conflict
of interest. 12 In Renpak v. Oppenheimer" a Florida court, while paying
lip service to this principle, failed to apply it. D, an officer, director,
stockholder and managing employee of P Corporation, while occupying
those capacities, secretly agreed with two of P's employees to form a
competing business and was instrumental in inducing some of P's customers
to transfer their accounts to the new business. Equitable relief was denied
to P. The court stressed the fact that the defendants did not begin
operation of the competing business until after the severance of their
relationship with P, but added that, ". . . nor is there any dispute that
planning and negotiations were under way before [defendants] had severed
their connections. .. "1 The court also observed that officers and directors
may enter into a competing business if they do so in "good faith." This
portion of the opinion is disturbing. It is difficult to imagine how directors
may plan and negotiate with respect to a competing business in good
faith during their service as directors. The apparent conflict of interest
and exposure of their integrity to selfish temptation is entirely incon-
sistent with their fiduciary relationship.'5
10. 102 So2d 600 (Fla. 1958). -
11. See also the companion case of Southern Creosoted Lumber Co. v. Morales,
113 So.2d 425 (Fla. App. 1959).
12. See Etheredge v. Barrow, 102 So.2d 660 (Fla. App. 1958) (Corporate official
not liable for breach of trust where he purchased corporate property at a tax sale with
the knowledge and consent of all other directors and shareholders).
13. 104 So,2d 642 (Fla. App. 1958). The case is noted in 13 U. MIAMI L. REv.
483 (1959).
14. 104 So.2d at 644.
15. The case is to he contrasted with another recent case, Cushman v. Schubert,
110 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1959), where defendants, who were ioint venturers with plaintiff,
formed a corporation and neglected to assicn a land contract to it btt instead assigned
the contract to another corporation. The court, in holding that the contract rightfully
be'onged to tie first corporation, charged defendants with "the duty of the finest and
highest loyalty . . . A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place." Id. at 705.
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The fiduciary relationship of directors to their corporation was
emphasized in Armenian Hotel Owners, Eic. v. Kulhaniian,1" where minority
shareholders instituted an equitable action against directors who fraudu-
lently had assigned the corporation's principal asset. The directors were
held accountable as constructive trustees for corporate losses resulting from
the assignment. In addition, the assignee, although not a director, had
been guilty of participation in the assignment to him. He, too, was held
accountable as a constructive trustee.
INSPECTION OF BOOKS AND RECORDS
As one of the owners of his company, a shareholder has the right
to inspect corporate books and records. But the right is not an absolute
one. If the purpose of his inspection is improper, the right will be denied.
At the common law it is necessary to allege inspection for a proper purpose,
but under a current Florida statute1 7 no such allegation is necessary. The
statute, however, covers stock books only. Thus the common-law rule
is still in cffect with respect to all other corporate books and records.
In State ex rel. Fussell v. McLendon,' P, owning 20 per cent of D
Corporation's shares, requested inspection of D's corporate books and
records to ascertain the value of her stock, to determine availability of
corporate funds for dividends, and to determine whether the affairs of
the corporation were being properly administered by the officers in charge.
Upon refusal of inspection, P brought a writ of mandamus. In holding
that the above three purposes were proper, the court observed that
inasmuch as the statute previously referred to is concerned solely with
the right to inspect stock books, it in no way abrogated the common-law
right to inspection of other corporate books and records.
In Florida Telephone Corporation v. State of Florida ex rel. Penin-
sular Telephone Company,'0 P, owner of more than one per Ccnteo- of
D's stock, sought, under the authority of the inspection statute, to examine
D's stock book for the purpose of compiling a list of the names, addresses
and respective stockholdings of D's shareholders, with the ultimate objective
of gaining control of D. In the subsequent mandamus proceeding D
16. 96 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1957). The decision was later modified by crediting the
defendant-assignee with the anount expended by him in obtaining the lease assignment.
Papazian v. Kulhanjian, 107 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1958).
17. FLA. STAr. § 608.39 (1953). Prior to its repeal in 1953, another statute,
FLA. STAT. § 611.23 (1951), provided for examination of all corporate hooks and
records at a reasonable time and place, without having to resort to mandamus, by a
shareholder or shareholders owning not less than one-tenth of the stock. No allegation
of inspection for a proper purpose was necessary. See Soreno Hotel v. State ex. tel.
Otis Elevator Co., 107 Ha. 195, 144 So. 359 (1932).
18. 109 So.2d 783 (Fla. App. 1959).
19. 111 So.2d 677 (Fla. App. 1959).
20. "The stock book or stock lists shall be open ... for inspection by any
judgment creditor of the corporation or any person who shall have been for at least
six months immediately preceding his demand a record holder of not less than one
per cent of the outstanding shares of such corporation . . ." FLA. STAT. § 608.39 (1955).
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defended on the ground that P had alleged no specific purpose for
securing the information. The court correctly held that the statute ampli-
fied and expanded common-law inspection rights by removing the common-
law restriction of alleging a proper purpose as a condition precedent to
the right of inspection of stock books. A further defense, that P's desire
to gain control constituted an improper purpose, was also unsuccessful.
The court realistically disposed of this defense by remarking that, "The
protection of interest by purchasing additional stock is a perfectly legitimate
enterprise . . . The desire to gain control is repugnant only to those
seeking its retention or more of the same."' 2
1
ExEcuTvF COMPENSATION
Three recent Florida cases involved the validity and reasonableness
of compensation to corporate officials when that compensation was fixed
by the officials themselves.22
Generally speaking, directors have power to determine the compensa-
tion paid to corporate officers. But suppose that some of the directors are
also officers. It is a familiar rule of corporate law that directors cannot
fix their own compensation unless expressly authorized by the charter or
the shareholders.23 Thus if a director's presence or vote at a meeting is
necessary to the passage of a resolution fixing his own compensation,
three views exist with respect of the validity of the resolution: (I) the
resolution is void; (2) the resolution is voidable at the option of objecting
shareholders; (3) the resolution is voidable at the option of objecting
shareholders upon a showing that the compensation is unfair and unreason-
able. A Florida court has adopted the third view.-4 Although the president
cast the deciding vote in his own favor on a resolution increasing his
compensation, the court refused to grant a summary judgment requested
by an objecting shareholder, holding that there was a material question
of fact as to the reasonableness of the salary increase. Of course, had
the court adopted the view that the resolution was voidable without any
showing of unfairness, no question of reasonableness would have been
considered. The view taken by the Florida court is in line with a recent
trend in other jurisdictions.2 5 In short, the reasoning behind this trend
proceeds from the premise that courts should not interfere in internal
2!. Florida Tel. Corp. v. State of Florida ex. rel. Peninsular Tel. Co., Ill So.2d 677,
681 (Fla. App. 1959).
22. Florida Flight & Eng. Corp. v. Shelton, 103 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1958); Sarasota
Tile & Terrazo Corp. v. DeSoto Terrazo Corp., 105 So.2d 811 (Fla. App. 1958);
Ilackley v. Oltz, 105 So.2d 20 (Fla. App. 1958).
23. See, e.g.. Redstone v. Redstone Lumber & Supply Co., 101 Fla. 226, 133
So. 882, 884 (1931).
24. Sarasota Tile & Terrazo Corp. v, DeSoto Terrazo Corp., 105 So.2d 811
(Fla. App. 1958).
25 See Church v. Ilarnit, 35 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1929), cert deied, 281 U.S. 372
(1930).
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affairs except in cases where such interference is essential to justice, or,
more particularly, in the executive compensation cases, where the com-
pensation is clearly unreasonable. Granting the soundness of this premise,
it is nevertheless submitted that the burden of proving reasonableness and
fairness should be on the interested director. But the court indicated that
the burden of proof rested with the one attacking the compensation, as
in cases where the compensation is determined by wholly disinterested
members of the board.20
In another recent case27 directors fixed their own salaries and voted
themselves bonuses after they had rendered services to the corporation.
The bomuses were determined by a formula providing for bonus payments
equal to approximately 20 per cent of the corporate income. The formula
made no reference to services rendered to the corporation by the directors.
The court held that the plaintiffs did not have to prove fraud on the
part of the defendants in order to be entitled to relief. The case is
squarely in line with the majority position that bonuses must be based
upon some reasonable relationship to the services performed or will be
vulnerable to attack on lie basis that such payments are in reality gifts,
which are subject to unanimous stockholder approval.
A third recent Florida case on executive compensation may well
become a leading one on the subject if for no other reason than the
fact that it involved multiple forms of claimed compensation from the
standpoint of both validity and reasonableness. Flight Equipment 6
Engineering Corp. Y. Shelton28 should serve well as a compensation guide
to both corporate attorneys and executives. The case presented a contro-
versy between a former corporate official and the corporation over various
types of compensation paid to the official during his tenure of office,
as follows: bonus, cancellation of a debt owed by the official to the
corporation, insurance premiums paid on the official's life with corporate
funds, overtime pay, and expenses incurred by the official.
With respect to a bonus of $10,000, the official had directed its
payment at a time when his compensation had been frozen by the Salary
Stabilization Board. The fact that the corporate directors subsequently
"ratified" the official's bonus payment was held to be immaterial, on the
basis that they had no power to ratify a void or illegal act. Next, the
official, without authority, had caused cancellation of a debt owed by him
to the corporation, treating the saving as an additional bonus. Inasmuch
as there was no authority for the cancellation and no ratification of it,
26. "ITI ]e order of the board was not void but was voidable at the suit of the
minority stockholders on a cogent showing by them that the salary fixed . . . was clearly
excessive and wasteful as against the minority." (Emphasis added.) Sarasota Tile &
Tcrrazo Corp. v. DcSoto Terrazo Corp., sUPra note 24, at 812.
27. THackley v. Oltz, 105 So.2d 20 (Fla. App. 1958).
28. 103 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1958).
1
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the corporation was held entitled to recover the amount owed. In addition,
the official had used corporate funds to pay insurance premiums on his
own life. Again, he was not authorized to take such action. He argued,
however, that the corporation was estopped to deny his authority because
the payments were shown on the corporate books and because the carrying
of such insurance coverage was standard procedure in numerous corpora-
tions. The court properly reasoned that there was no basis for estoppel
due to the fact that the official at the time was in complete control of
the corporation's fiscal and management affairs and therefore could not
claim the benefit of estoppel or procedure in other corporations as
excuses for his own unauthorized acts. During his tenure in office the
official had collected ovcrtime pay, on the basis that he was a "salaried"
employee" of the corporation and therefore entitled to additional com-
pensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 in each week. In refuting
this argument the court distinguished between a corporate officer and
an ordinary employee, holding that an officer must devote such time and
effort to the performance of his duties as is reasonably required of him. Unlike
an employee, he is not required to work a specified schedule of hours. Further-
more, the court observed that an officer's compensation is properly fixed by
the directors and that lie is without authority to fix or increase his own
compensation.29 Finally, the official had received expenses in the form
of a car allowance and car rentals. Since the trial court had found these
expenses to have been reasonably incurred for the benefit of the corpora-
tion, the official was held legally entitled to be reimbursed for such
of them as were properly accounted for by him. However, the official
had also charged the corporation with an expense for the appointment
of a receiver in bankruptcy proceedings. This corporate expense, having
been incurred as a result of the official's negligent and unauthorized act,
was held to be recoverable by the corporation.
Three other recent cases dealt with indirect compensation in the
form of stock options and stock allotmentsa
LEGISLATION
The 1959 session of the Florida Legislature produced several changes
in the Florida Securities Act:" and one in the Corporate Code.32
29. Sec discussion of Sarasota Tile and Ilackley cases, sofra.
30. Coach Cities Coaches, Inc, v. Whyte, 102 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1958) (corpora-
tion held entitled to dedoet corporate indebtedness in determining fund out of which
debt to plaintiff was to be repaid under agreement that such debt was to be satisfied
out of "net earnings"); Calhoun V. Corbisello, 100 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1958) (plaintiff
failed to recover an ariount paid by bin on an option to porchase all of the outstanding
slsaies held by defendants in the corporation due to his own failure to perfonm;
Goldfarb Novelty Co. of Florida v. Vann, 94 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1957) (corporation held
obligated to pay plaintiff tnder an agreement whereby he was employed as its manager
and salesman and was to receive as partial compensation for his services a certain
number of shares of stock).
31. FLA. S'r'r. eli. 517 (1951).
32. FLA. STAT. ch. 608 (1953).
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With respect to the Florida Securities Act, the Florida Securities
Commission, for the first time, was granted specific rule-making power.
Heretofore, the "rules and regulations" of the Commission have been
issued sporadically in the form of mimeographed "releases." Securities
attorneys soon learn of the marked difference which exists between SEC
and state administrative practice in this respect. On the federal level
there are exhaustive (and sometimes exasperating) rules and regulations
for almost every conceivable situation, while on the state level the absence
of formality is the rule rather than the exception. Flexibility is the order
of the day. This state of affairs can be both good and bad -from the
viewpoint of the securities attorney and his client. By way of illustration,
an SEC examiner is bound to act within well-defined limitations, but
a state securities examiner, restricted by no set of rules, can "bend over
backwards" to grant a concession. By the same token, the state examiner
can be arbitrary and "make ad hoc determinations in a way which would
have shocked the SEC during the most halcyon days of the New Deal.
33
Most Florida attorneys will welcome a well-defined set of rules and
regulations in this area, that is, if the Commission sees fit to draft and
adopt them.
The Florida Securities Act lists a number of exempted securities -
securities which may be sold to the public without registration and
attendant scrutiny by the Commission. Among these exempted securities
was short-term commercial paper, such as negotiable promissory notes
which mature in a year or less. As securities prices advanced during the
late 1950's, an avid investing public rushed into the market on a gigantic
scale. With this influx of new speculative money came charlatans and
other types of securities fraud artists. The practice grew up of offering
a 15 per cent return on short-term paper, often "secured" by lien on
worthless or near-worthless realty or personal property. Of course, in
order to pay a 15 per cent return, the issuer of such paper would have
to earn as high as 25 per cent on the invested funds. Needless to say,
the perpetrators of these schemes frequently folded their tents and crept
away, leaving the "investor" holding the bag. A much needed amendment
now exempts short-term paper with a maximum yield of eight per cent
which "shall not be secured by lien on real or tangible personal property. '34
Similarly, the sale of long-term secured notes or bonds was exempt
where such notes or bonds were sold to not more than 20 purchasers and
the total face amount of all notes or bonds secured by a single mortgage
did not exceed $10,000. Sellers of such paper could avoid registration by
limiting their offerings as stated above and then selling successive packages
33. Loss & CowErr, BLUE SKY LAW 45 (1958).
34. FLA. STAT. § 517.05(9) (1959).
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of the same character free of Commission examination. The amendment
prohibits successive filings of this type by any one issuer3 5
Other 1959 amendments to the Florida Securities Act: broadened
the exemption with respect to securities exchanged for other securities
of an issuer;38 made the pre-incorporation exemption applicable to part-
nerships and trusts; 37 added a new "fair, just and equitable" standard for
registration by qualification;38 provided that the registration of securities
by qualification or notification which have been revoked, denied or with-
drawn may not be registered by the simple process of announcement; 9
required that applicants for dealer's and salesmen's licenses establish
financial responsibility;40 broadened procedural requirements with respect
to revocation hearings on licenses of dealers and salesmen. 41
A single amendment to the Corporate Code now makes it unnecessary
to state in the application for the certificate of incorporation the number
of shares which each subscriber agrees to take.42
FLA. STAT. § 517.06(8) (1959).
FLA. STAT. § 517.06(9) (1959).
FLA. STAT. § 517.06(10) (1959).
FLA. STAT. § 517.09(7) (1959).
FLA. STAT. § 517.091(3) (1959).
FiA. STAT. § 517.12(4) (1959).
FLA. STAT. § 517.20 (1959).
FLA. STAT. § 608.03(2)(i) (1959).
